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Pruss and Rasmussen's Contingency Cosmological Argument

Formulation​

  1. For any particular contingent concrete things, there is an explanation of the fact that they exist.
  2. Considering all the contingent concrete things that exist, if there is an explanation of the fact that those things exist, then there is a necessary concrete thing.
  3. Therefore, there is a necessary concrete thing. (1, 2)

A concrete thing here refers to something that has causal powers. This argument, unlike the previous one, does not require an ontological commitment to things like sums or aggregates.

There is not much to say about this argument, so below is just commentary on each part:

  1. The first premise is an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) on contingent concrete things. While reasonable, some may object to this premise by denying the PSR.
  2. The second premise is difficult to justify. It is not clear why the explanation of contingent things must be necessary and concrete. As stated in previous arguments, one explanation could just be: "There necessarily exists some contingent concrete objects."
  3. The conclusion follows from the premises, but does not lead to a theistic conception of God.